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Need We Fear Japanese Competition? 
A FTER YEARS Of r e l a t i v e  indifference, A m e r -  i cans  have suddenly become aentely 
aware of foreign trade and competition. For 
the first time in recent history, we have a 
balance-of-payments problem. Expenditures 
abroad by the government and private citizens 
are exceeding pttrehases from the United 
States by other nations, causing a heavy out- 
flow of gold from our country in settlement of 
international claims. Unemployment is high 
in some industries hard hit by foreign compe- 
tition. These facts are cause, for concern and 
have stimulated a general re-evaluation of our 
foreign trade policies; the government has 
taken steps to restore balance in our interna- 
tional accounts, and is contemplating further 
action. In addition, many suggestions for han- 
dling the present situation have been made. 
Some will help. to. correct the problems with- 
out doing long-run damage to the position of 
Mr. Rewoldt is Professor of Marketing in the School of 
Business Administration, University of Michigan. He re- 
cently spent one year in Iapan as Adviser, Institute for 
Research in Productivity, Waseda University, Tokyo. 
the United States in international trade. Some 
proposals, however, based on uninformed 
opinion and a misunderstanding of foreign 
trade, will perhaps solve the present problems, 
but only at the expense of our future position 
in the world market. 
Competition from Japan, more than that 
from any other country, has been widely rec- 
ognized as a threat to U.S. industry. The re- 
sults of one survey 1 show that over one-third 
of those interviewed oppose trade with Japan 
because they feel that it will harm the United 
States economy. There was more opposition 
only to trade with Soviet Russia. This attitude 
toward trade with Japan is held despite the 
fact that we trade less with Japan than with a 
number of other countries, and also despite the 
fact that the United States sells more to Japan 
than we buy in return. It is the purpose o~ this 
artiele to. review trade between the two coun- 
tries, to consider whether such trade is a threat 
1 "Buying Japanese," Business Week (September 19, 
1959), p. 150. 
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TABLE I 
Japanese Trade with the United States, 1954-58 
(in millions of dollars) 
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 
Exports .................................................................. 282.9 457.1 551.6 606.6 692.5 
Imports ..................................................................... 849.1 7 7 4 . 0  1,067.4 1 ,626.2  1,057.7 
Net trade balance ............................................ -566.2 -316.9 -515.8 -1,019.6 -365.2 
SOURCE: Statistical Ot~ce of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, YEAX~BOOX OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
STATISTICS: 1958 (New York, 1959), p. 328. 
to the economic welfare of the United States, 
to evaluate the competitive strength of Jap- 
anese industry, axed to reach conclusions con- 
cerning what actions, if any, should be taken 
regarding such trade. Although the conclu- 
sions will apply specifically to Japanese- 
United States trade, they are also suggestive 
of what our position should be concerning in- 
ternational trade in general. 
T H E  T R A D E  P I C T U R E  
Our imports from Japan have been increasing 
at a rapid rate in recent years. From $282.9 
million in 1954, imports rose to $692.5 million 
by 1958, an increase of 145 per cent in four 
years. During the first three quarters of 1959, 
imports amounted to $726.4 million, more 
than the total for the full year of 1958. For all 
of 1959, Japanese exports to the United States 
exceeded those of the previous year by 50 per 
cent. Our sales to Japan, on the other hand, in- 
creased only 2 per cent during 1959. In the 
first quarter of 1960, the demand for Japanese 
products continued to increase, raising our im- 
ports from Japan 31.2 per cent. This upward 
trend began to falter in the second quarter of 
1960 when the rate of increase fell to 12.7 per 
cent. During the third quarter, the growth was 
less than 1 per cent. 2 It is, however, too early 
2Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute, Month l y  Cir- 
cular, Survey  of  E c o n o m i c  Condi t ions  in Japan ( D e c e m -  
ber, 1960),  p. 8. 
to tell if this recent decrease in demand for 
Japanese products in the United States is only 
temporary or if this constitutes the end of the 
long upward trend. 
At first glance, Japan's increase in exports to 
the United States seems ominous, and results 
in cries for action to. halt the flood of Japanese 
products. But when this situation is looked at 
in proper perspective (see Table 1 ), it is less 
evident that a need for drastic action exists. 
Japan's exports to the United States have in- 
creased rapidly-but  from a very lOW base. 
If we consider only the exchange of identifi- 
able products between the two countries ( and 
this is the pertinent comparison if we axe try- 
ing to assess relative competitive effective- 
ness ), Japan has, year in and year out, suffered 
a deficit in trade with the United State,s. The 
United States has recognized Japan's need for 
removing this deficit and has been, in general, 
sympathetic to actions taken by Japan toward 
this end. Not much progress in this direction 
was made before, 1959. The problem was made 
extremely difficult by the heavy dependence 
of the Japanese economy on imports, particu- 
larly imports from the United States. These 
imports could not be reduced without unfa- 
vorable effects upon the Japanese economy. 
Thus the only available approach was to at- 
tempt to increase exports in order to. earn the 
funds necessary for these indispensable im- 
ports. The efforts to do this have at last begun 
to bear fruit. 
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C A U S E  F O R  C O N C E R N ?  
It is interesting to. speculate why there is so 
much concern about imports into the United 
States market from Japan when, in fact, the 
Japanese have long been better customers for 
us than we have been~for them. Perhaps there 
are many reasons for this attitude, but three 
factors appear to be of primary importance. 
First, the trend in Japan's exports to the 
United States has been consistently upward 
over a long period, while no such upward 
trend is evident in our exports to Japan. Sec- 
ond, imports from Japan make a big impres- 
sion on the consumer market and compete 
directly with American-made goods; this is 
not true of our exports to Japan. Third, imports 
from Japan tend to be concentrated in certain 
product lines and often represent a significant 
share of sales for these types of products in our 
market. 
The Trend 
Table i shows a consistent and substantial in- 
crease in Japan's exports to the United States 
since 1954. In fact, such exports have been 
rising ever since the end of World War II. Al- 
though our exports to Japan have been con- 
sistently larger than our purchases from that 
country, they have fluctuated widely and no 
upward trend is evident. A simple extrapola- 
tion of these trends leads to the conclusion 
that the U.S. will soon be buying far more 
from Japan than it will be selling to Japan. 
Should this occur, it would aggravate our 
balance-of-payments problem and perhaps re- 
duce employment here. One of the conclusions 
than can be drawn from this article as a whole, 
however, is that these relative trends will 
probably not continue. 
Direct Competition 
Our imports from Japan are mainly consumer 
products: clothing, tots , chinaware, photo- 
graphic equipment, transistor radios, stainless 
steel flatware, and so on. These products are 
usually branded, easily recognized as Japanese 
imports, and widely distributed throughout 
the United States. United States products ex- 
ported to Japan, on the other hand, include 
wheat, raw cotton, scrap, iron, fertilizers, and 
soybeans, plus a great variety of capital equip- 
ment items. Raw materials and capital goods 
imports do not make much of an impression on 
the public. Hence, there is little awareness of 
the volume of such imports. 
In most instances, Japanese imports com- 
pete in our market with similar products of 
United States manufacture. This competition 
threatens United States industry as well as 
domestic employment. Politicians are sympa- 
thetic to the plight of these industries, and 
there has been much discussion in Congress 
and elsewhere about what should be, done to 
help them. A similar reaction does not occur 
in Japan. Japan lacks raw materials o.f most 
kinds, and, as a result, imports from the United 
States do. not compete with Japanese products. 
Concentration of Exports 
Although many different goods are: imported 
into the United States from Japan, there is a 
significant degree of concentration in a few 
classes of products. In the first half of 1959, 
over two million Japanese radios were shipped 
to this country. Over 90 per cent of the china- 
ware purchased in the U.S. is imported, mostly 
from Japan. In 1958, Japanese stainless steel 
flatware, exports to the United States equaled 
one-half of our domestic outpnt. Photographic 
goods imported from Japan rose from $1.2 
million to $28.2 million between 1954 and 
1958. These are dramatic figures, and they re- 
flect a major competitive threat to several 
United States industries. Our sales to Japan, 
with a few exceptions (cotton, for example), 
represent just a small percentage of total 
United States output of these products. It thus 
appears to many people that some of our in- 
dustries are suffering substantially from Jap- 
anese competition, while others are benefiting 
only modestly from their exports to Japan. 
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Under these circumstances, it is easy to forget 
that it is Japan that traditionally suffers a defi- 
cit in its trade with the United States. 
J A P A N ' S  E C O N O M Y  
Although our trade relations with Japan have 
in the past been satisfactory, it is possible that 
our imports will continue to rise while our ex- 
ports do not keep. pace. This imbalance is un- 
likely to happen in the near future because 
Japan appears willing to remove restrictions 
on imports from the United States in order to 
prevent it. Our exports to Japan in 1960 in- 
creased 37 per cent over 1959 after the Jap- 
anese government lifted import restrictions 
on 270 items. The likelihood of a severe im- 
balance of trade in the future will depend 
largely on the relative competitive strength of 
United States and Japanese industry. A closer 
look at the Japanese economy and its industry 
will be helpful in determining the effective- 
ness of our competition with Japanese indus- 
try. 
Over-AU Strength 
The present state of health of Japan's economy 
looks good indeed. In the, period from 1950 to 
1953, Japan's gross national product grew at 
an annual rate, of over 10 per cent. This high 
level was due in part to the Korean conflict. 
From 1953 to 1957, the annual rate of growth 
was about 7 to, 8 per cent. The year 1958 was a 
bad one for Japanese exports because o,f the 
recession in the United States, but in 1959 the 
rate of growth climbed to an astonishing 16 
per cent, thus making up all at once for the 
lack of growth the year before. In 1960, the 
Japanese economy grew at a rate of 12 per 
cent. In order to see the growth of the Jap- 
anese economy in perspective, it must be 
noted that in this same decade the United 
States economy was growing at an annual rate 
of around 3 per cent. 
The rapid growth of Japan's economy is due 
mainly to. the growth of industrial production. 
Industrial production indexes for the period 
1950-57 (1934-36----100) are as follows: 
1950 93 1954 167 
1951 118 1955 190 
1952 131 1956 232 
1953 161 1957 263 
These data reflect an average annual rate of 
increase in industrial production of 16 per cent 
between 1950 and 1957. It should be remem- 
bered, however, that this rate of growth was 
built on a very low base. Reflected here is a 
"catching up." with other countries, since Jap- 
anese industry was virtually wiped out at the 
end of World War II. Also, this rapid rate of 
growth is not likely to continue as Japan's 
economy reaches higher levels o.f maturity. As 
late as 1955, employment in Japan was still 
distributed as follows: 41.2 per cent in pri- 
mary, 23.8 per cent in secondary, and 35.0 per 
cent in tertiary or service industries. The 
United States, in contrast, has only 4.3 per cent 
of its employment in primary, 34.8 in second- 
ary, and 60.9 per cent in tertiary industries. 
As Japan's employment in tertiary industries 
increases, its rate of growth will decrease. 
Increasing E I~ciency 
Along with industrial output, productivity of 
Japanese labor has also been increasing at a 
rapid rate, as shown in Table 2. Notice, how- 
ever, that it was not until 1953 that  produc- 
tivity reached the prewar level. The 36 per 
cent increase in the next three-year period, 
therefore, is not so hard to comprehend. Again, 
it reflects a "catching up" with the rest o,f the 
world and does not necessarily indicate that 
Japan is going to surge ahead o.f its competi- 
tors in international trade. Japan's productiv- 
ity increase reflects a high rate o,f investment 
in industrial plant and equipment during the 
1950's. From 1950 to 1958, the percentage of 
Japan's gross national product invested in in- 
dustrial plant and equipment was 17 per cent. 3 
3Keizai Kakusho Zuzetzu, Economic White Paper, 
( Tokyo: Economic Planning Agency, 1960), p. 3. 
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TABLE 2 





Year Productivity Real Wages of Output 
1947 25 28 110 
1948 38 47 124 
1949 49 59 122 
1950 61 77 125 
1951 80 84 106 
1952 86 96 111 
1953 103 103 100 
1954 106 105 99 
1955 118 110 93 
1956 139 120 86 
S O U R C E :  E C O N O M I C  S U R V E Y  O F  A S I A  A N D  T H E  F A I ~  E A S T :  1957, 
Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East (Bangkok, 1958), 
p. 46. 
The investment in industrial plant and equip- 
ment in the United States during this same 
period was 9 per cent of the gross national 
product. In absolute terms, of course, United 
States investment was much larger. 
During the second half of 1959 and the first 
half of 1960, the author visited a large number 
of Japanese: plants. Despite the recent heavy 
investment in Japanese industry, an observer 
cannot help but conclude that Japan is still 
behind the United States in most aspects of 
industrial efficiency. 
The Labor Cost Factor 
Much of the opposition in the United States 
to imports from Japan centers on the "cheap 
labor" factor; the argument is that United 
States industry cannot compete in trade with 
a nation whose labor is "exploited" in order to 
make low production costs possible. It is true 
that labor costs in Japan are low by United 
States standards. The average Japanese family 
has an income about one-seventh of the in- 
come of the average United States family. In 
many industries the ratio is even greater. 
Japan has what is often referred to as a "duo- 
economy," with large firms and small finns 
forming separate and distinct economic struc- 
tures. Wage rates in small finns are only about 
40 per cent of the level in large firms. It is 
these low wages in small firms that are often 
quoted when comparisons with United States 
wages are made. However, these small firms 
are not competitive despite their low labor 
costs because they are inefficient and do not 
export in significant volume. Because it is the 
large-scale industry of Japan that exports to 
the United States, the wage rates paid in this 
sector are important in our discussion. 
To simply compare wage rates between Ja- 
pan and the United States does not tell the 
whole story of relative labor costs. Japanese 
wage costs, though lower, are relatively more 
fixed than in the United States. Once hired, 
labor in large companies in Japan tends to 
have permanent tenure, and employment does 
not fluctuate greatly with changes in volume 
of output. There is a strongly ingrained tradi- 
tion of paternalism that provides Japanese 
employees with the equivalent of a guaran- 
teed annual wage. This same attitude, of pa- 
ternalism means a high cost for fringe benefits 
such as employee housing, recreational facili- 
ties, and medical care. Employees are retired 
at the early age of 55, and the company pro- 
vides for all minimum needs of the retired 
employee and his family. Compensation in 
Japanese companies is based largely on senior- 
ity and family responsibility rather than on 
contribution. This system does not stimulate 
high productivity. One should also remember 
that the low average wage cost in Japan exists 
side by side with a very high cost of capital 
and raw materials. To a large degree, these 
factors offset one another. 
Table 2 shows that wages 
pace with rising productivity 
wage costs per unit of output 
have not kept 
in Japan, and 
have declined. 
This is due in large measure to widespread 
underemployment, sometimes called "dis- 
guised unemployment," in Japan's labor mar- 
ket. It has been estimated that the extent of 
such underemployment in Japan is between 6 
82 BUSINESS HORIZONS--SUMMER, 1961 
and 7 million, or over 15 per cent of the labor 
force. Thus, as Japan's economy grows and 
the demand for labor rises, there is no upward 
pressure on wage costs. Japan's population, 
however, has now stabilized, and the amount 
of such underemployment will thus gradually 
be reduced as the.. economy grows. By 1970 or 
thereabouts, it probably will no longer be a 
major factor holding down labor costs. Also, 
Japanese. labor unions are growing in strength, 
and Japanese people generally are strongly de- 
manding a better life. Upward pressures on 
labor costs are  bornnd to come. 
Other Competitive Weaknesses 
Japan's heavy dependence on far-flung sources 
of supply is probably the major competitive 
weakness of Japanese industry. Dispropor- 
tionately high raw materials costs rule out Ja- 
pan as a competitor in most eases where ma- 
terial costs, not labor costs, are the major part 
of total cost. To this must be added the fact 
that Japan is disad~eantageously located in re- 
lation to the major markets of the free world, 
primarily North America and Western Eu- 
rope. This. rules out Japan as a strong competi- 
tor wherever transportation costs, relative to 
product value, are high. 
Most countries are strong as exporters of 
those products that also have a large domestic 
market. This situation creates economies of 
scale, and helps to give the exporting firm a 
strong position in world markets. Looked at in 
this light, Japan's low wage scale,, which limits 
domestic demand, actually retards exports. In 
contrast to the United States, Japan has a po- 
tentially large domestic demand for relatively 
few products. Its export strength to date has 
been largely in those lines where its domestic 
demand is also. high (for example, textiles and 
cameras), and it is unlikely to suddenly be- 
come a strong competitor in other fields. 
Our assessment of Japan as a competitor has 
been based mainly on its advantages and dis- 
advantages in production and transportation 
costs. It would be a serious error not to point 
out that Japan also suffers, and perhaps more 
than Other areas, from a lack of sophistication 
in marketing. Marketing research is just be- 
ginning to be recognized in Japan, and its in- 
dustry has made many mistakes because it 
made wrong assumptions about markets and 
competition. Product development in Japan is 
still largely a hit-or-miss affair, involving virtu- 
ally 11o marketing research at all. Its domestic 
distribution system is quite inefficient, with 
the manufacturer often exerting little influ- 
ence over the marketing of his product once it 
leaves his own hands. Japanese firms tend to 
follow the same policy abroad, selling through 
middlemen whose activities they do not effec- 
tively supervise or control. Perhaps this ex- 
plains their heavy reliance o,n price to attract 
interest in the market. Where a low price will 
not sell a product, they are not aware of alter- 
native approaches. In the future, as their cost 
advantage declines, their competitive price 
advantage can also be expected to weaken. 
S O M E  O T H E R  F A C T O R S  
On the basis of a comparison of our exports to 
and imports from Japan, it is obvious that the 
U.S. derives substantial benefits from such 
trade. It is, however, a mistake to reach con- 
clusions about the benefits from trade with 
Japan on this basis alone; some important po- 
litical factors must also be considered. 
Japan occupies a position of strategic sig- 
nificance in our foreign policy. It is the great- 
est bulwark of freedom and capitalism in all 
of Asia; it is one of our most important military 
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bases in the struggle against world commu- 
nism; it is a showpiece for all the world to see 
of the effectiveness of free enterprise in eco- 
nomic development. Potentially, it is one of 
our strongest allies in providing aid and guid- 
ance to underdeveloped lands, particularly in 
Southeast Asia. Surely it is in the best inter- 
ests of the United States that Japan remains 
strong economically. 
Japan cannot remain strong economically 
without a healthy foreign trade. In order to 
keep its economy operating it must import all 
of its requirements for cotton, wool, rubber, 
phosphates, bauxite, and off. It  is heavily de- 
pendent on outside sources for wheat, sugar, 
soybeans, salt, and coking coal. To pay for 
these imports, Japan must export. If exports 
fail to grow, the economy cannot grow. In re- 
cent years, Japan has had to import an amount 
equal to about 15 per cent of its net nationa~ 
income. At the same time, its exports were 
running at a level of about 12 per cent of net 
national income.' 
Not only is foreign trade essential to the eco- 
nomic well-being of Japan, but trade with the 
United States in particular is highly impor- 
tant to Japan's economy. In 1959, some 40 per 
cent of Japanese imports came from the 
United States, which in return absorbed some 
35 per cent of Japan's exports. 5 This is a major 
shift from the prewar period when only 27 per 
cent of Japanese imports came from the 
United States and 18 per cent of its exports 
went to the United States. This change in the 
relative importance of the United States in 
Japan's foreign trade reflects in large part the 
loss of China and some other parts of Asia as 
sources of supply and markets. A logical alter- 
native to trade with the United States is for 
Japan again to trade with these areas, now 
part of the Communist bloc. This might un- 
dermine Japan's position as a market for 
4H. Michael Sapir, lapan, China, and the West (Wash- 
ington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1959), p. 12. 
aKeizai Yoran, Economic Summaries, (Tokyo: Eco- 
nomic Planning Agency, 1959 ), p. 174. 
United States exports, and would certainly 
cause undesirable complications for our for- 
eign policy. 
With Japan so heavily dependent on im- 
ports, it follows that a healthy Japanese econ- 
omy will provide a good market for United 
States exports. We produce many of the things 
that country needs. The relationship between 
our imports from and our exports to Japan is, 
however, even more direct than this. Some of 
the products we sell Japan go into products 
we, in turn, buy back. One of our major im- 
ports from Japan is cotton textiles, and Japan 
is by far America's best customer for raw cot- 
ton. We import steel and steel products from 
Japan, and the United States supplies Japan 
with from 33~ to 50 per cent of the scrap 
metal and 25 to 30 per cent of the coking coal 
needed by its iron and steel industry. Thus, 
action to reduce our imports from Japan 
would directly affect our opportunity to ex- 
port. There is at present much discussion of 
the necessity to build United States exports to 
correct our balance-of-payments difl]c~ties. 
Cutting our imports does not seem the best 
way of accomplishing this objective. 
ON THE BASIS Of the above evaluation, we can 
make the following conclusions concerning 
trade between Japan and the U.S.: 
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1 The competitive strength of Japanese in- 
dustry is increasing in relation to the  competi- 
tive strength of United States industry. This 
narrowing of the gap is probably inevitable 
considering the different levels of maturi ty of 
the two economies and the  greater ease with 
which an economy can advance in certain 
earlier stages. 
2 I t  is to the  advantage of the United States 
for Japan to be strong economically. Japan is 
an important  customer for u n i t e d  States pro- 
ducts now, and as her  economy grows Japan is 
likely to become an even better customer. 
The continued economic strength of Japan is 
also very important  from the standpoint  of 
American foreign policy. Japan's economic 
strength is heavily dependent  err its foreign 
trade and, in turn, the United States market  
is extremely important to the foreign trade of 
Japan. 
3 United States industry is still more com- 
petitive than the industry of Japan. If our 
industry rises to the challenge of competition 
from Japan, it can be expected to hold its 
stronger position. I t  has no need of govern- 
ment  help for this purpose. 
4 The United States government  should 
not set up  artificial barriers restricting the sale 
of Japanese goods in the United States market. 
Rather, it should make our own businessmen 
aware of the  opportunities for sale of United 
States products, both in Japan and elsewhere. 
A major assistance to business would be the 
removal of restrictions that  still exist in Japan 
and other countries on the  importation of 
United States products. 
0 un CrdSAT state of California produces about sixty millions of dol- 
lars in gold every year, besides silver, quicksilver, precious stones, 
and many other valuable articles. Japan is also a rich and fertile 
country, and produces many very valuable articles. Yottr imperial 
majesty's subjects are skilled in many of the arts. I am desirous that 
our two countries should trade with each other, for the benefit both 
of Japan and the United States. 
We know that the ancient laws of your imperial majesty's govern- 
ment do not allow of foreign trade . . . but, as the state of the 
world changes and new governments are formed, it seems to be wise, 
from time to time, to make new laws . . . .  [We] think that ff your 
imperial majesty were so far to change the ancient laws as' to allow 
a free trade between the two countries it would be extremely bene- 
ficial to both. 
MILLARD FILLI~IORE, PRESIDENT OF TIIE UNITED STATES 
TO HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY, THE E~CEPEROR OF JAPAN--185~ 
